considered not only in respect to wages, but to guidelines, or the appropriateness of such guidelines, ag• eed upon. The conferences allowed the to 1Bit dDwa the employers to cry poverty, and the union moveaa1 PI lie membership as a major player in the ef the conference failed to achieve its own at llllt -. perspective, the tri-partite conference was a good public ~ellltieal confines of the tri-partite wage conferern, characterised the relations between govet••ments and the c.dllll designing the shape of the National Party's Employment Contracts Bill. By the time of the last tri-partite conference in August 1990, the NZEF was critical of the forum, and did not see it as appropriate to the decentralised wage fixing system it was now advocating. The last tri-partite wage conference was adjourned to await the outcome of the election.
The adjournment of the tri-partite conference marked the faltering status of the union movement. The election in October 1990 resulted in the defeat of the fourth Labour government, and signalled the death knell for the Compact. Hence, the union movement's fall from grace was sudden and the slope w, as steep. On one side of the ẽlection, the trade union movement had sufficient status to be a party to a Compact with the government described by the then Prime Minister, Jeffrey Palmer, as "a significant step forward in developing new ways for the social partners to work together for a better future." On the day before the election, the union movement had a role in which it could potentially affect the future social and economic progrẽss of the country. Less than two weeks after the election the headlines in The Dominion newspaper announced "PM Hedges On Accord".
The Government did not commit itself on the Compact. It drafted the Employment Contracts Bill with the assistance of an employee of the Wellington Employers Association, and put the aspects of the Bill which directly affected the union movement into effect _ without genuine consultation with the unions. Immediately following the election, not only was the Compact abandoned, but the labour law as it provided for tri-partite wage fixing and the recognition of the central organisation of employees, was abolished. The failure of tri-partite provisions of the Labour Relations Act 1987 (the LRA) had for some time been apparent, and to this extent the abolition of the tri-partite approach was of little practical significance to labour law. Nevertheless, it was of major symbolic significance. The demise of a century old tradition of centralised wage fixing corresponded with the demolition within labour law of the status of the central organisation of trade unions. But the statutory bums-rush was directed, not only at the central organisation of the trade union movement, but also against its constituent membership.
Disorganising organised labour
The LRA of 1987 provided for a fonn of compulsory union membership. It rẽquired the insertion of a standard clause, the unqualified preference clause, in all awards and agreements where ẽmployers and unions agreed to its insertion. The standard clause provided that employees were required to join the union within 14 days of being requested to do so by the union. If the employer party and the union did not agree, a ballot was conducted. The standard clause was not inserted unless a majority of the covẽred employees voting voted in support of its insertion. This arrangement was decided upon after a series of legislative experiments with different types of union membership provisions. The National government had introduced voluntary unionism effective February 1984. Voluntary unionism cut deeply into union membership. In 1985 the Labour government again changed the legislation. The unqualified preferẽnce provision was ~equired to be in every award and agreement. And this was again modified by the LRA m 1987. As noted, the unqualified preference clause was now to be inserted either by The legal status of unions
The tenn "union" is conspicuously absent from the ECA. The Act is essentially silent as to how a union and , an employer are to treat one another during collective bargaining.
Section 185 (l) does refer to unions, but only for the purpose of deeming unions which were forrnally registe~ed under the Labour Relations Act to be registered under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908. The trade union therefore is like any other group of persons joined for purposes other than · pecuniary gain, and incorporated under the Incorporated Societies Act. However, the absence of the tetm "union" from the Act is more than just a political snub or legal slight. Under the LRA, a registered union had automatic bargaining rights in respect of ẽmployees who perfotrned work that fell within the scope of the union's membership rules. The union was most often the applicant for a new or renewed award, and was therefore an original party to the award.
Under the ECA a union has no particular status. Its ~egistration under the Incorporated Societies Act does not convey bargaining status upon a union. A union must have received authority to bargain on behalf of employees from the employees themselves. Hence, the union does not have original party status in the , sense that the union is the initiator of negotiations for new or renewed contracts. The "original" parties to an employment contract are employers and the employees. Once an individual or collective contract is settled, then the representative may be a party to the contract with the consent of the other parties. That representative might be a union, or it might be a lawyer or industrial advocate or consultant. The advantage to a union and its membership in the union being a party to the contract is that the union can enforce the contract, and agree to or veto a variation of the contract during its currency.
On the other hand, a union becoming a party to a contract could potentially become the of subject of an action for damages where the contract is breached. This may be particularly important in the case of an illegal strike, such as a wildcat strike carried out by a small sector of workers without the approval of the general membership. Therefore, there may be some disadvantage to a union in being a party to a collective contract. In any event a union fmding it a necessity to take an enforcement or compliance action during the currency of a contract is likely to have negotiated the collective contract with an employer of sufficient hostility to refuse to allow the union to be a party to the contract. The experience thus far under the ECA has been that there is some--considerable resistance to unions becoming parties to collective contracts. Unions have succeeded in doing so only in lis approximately 25 percent of collective contracts (Harbridge, 1993:74) .
Walter Grills
Standing before the Employment Court and Tribunal
A union is an incorporated society for whatever purposes the union's rules stipulate. However, the union has only the potential status of a representative under the ECA to represent its membership before the Employment Tribunal or Employment Court.
Registration under the LRA gave the union the automatic right to represent its membership.
A union's standing before the fottner Mediation Service and Labour Court was seldom challenged. No such automatic right to represent its members exists for a union under the ECA. Section 59 provides that an employee may choose to be ~epresented in order to ex, ercise general rights established under the Act. But it does not automatically follow that an employee has given the union authority merely because the person is a member of the
A set of union rules providing that the union shall be a representative in any or all possible legal actions under the ECA may be in conflict with the Act itself. Subsection 59 (3) provides that "Any person purporting to represent any employee or employer shall establish that person's authority for that representation". This section speaks of employee in the singular, and not of employees collectively. The word "that" emphasises the individual person and a particular representation. In Ward v , Christchurch Transport [(1992] l ERNZ 306), despite an employee signing a general authority for the union to act on behalf of the employee, the evidence demonstrated that the particular employee did not want to join other employees as an applicant in the particular proceedings. While the possibility ~emains that the Court may under certain circumstances accept that a "class action" by one or a relative few employees on behalf of a general class of similarly placed employees is appropriate, it appears that that will be the exception under the ECA, not the rule. The onus is on the union, as representative, to convince the Court of the appropriateness of the approach (see United Food etc Union of NZ v Talley [1992] 3 ERNZ 423).
In Adams v Alliance Textiles ([1992] 1 ERNZ 982) the union sought to have a collective contract set aside, but could not convince sufficient union members to give their authority to proceed with the case have the collective contract set aside in its entirety. The Employment Court considered the merits of the case only insofar as the collective contract applied to those who had given authority to the union to run the , case. The Chief Judge emphasised the importance of having clear individual authorities from employees. The difficulty from the union point of view is that individual employees do not wish to reveal their opposition to an aggressive employer, particularly during times of high unemployment. The difficulty for the Tribunal or the Court is that there is no ẽvidence either way. On the face of the Alliance case, the workers may have been intimidated, or they may simply have been happy with the collective contract.
Unions as bargaining agents
The idea that the union can act on its own authority is severely limited under the ECA. That is because the union must be a party to a collective contract in order to appear before the Employment Tribunal or Employment Court on an enforcement matter, and employers are reluctant to agree to unions being party to their collective contracts. The limitations t The Impact of the ECA '91 also extend to collective bargaining. Section 10 of the Act establishes the right of employees to be represented in the negotiation of their employment contracts. Section 12 pertains specifically to the authority needed by unions and other bargaining agents to represent employees in the negotiation of · employment contacts. Subsection 12 ( 1) requires that the representative establish its authority. Ideally, the r· epresentative will have an authorization signed by the employee or employees. The significance of the impact of this section should not be overlooked.
Under the LRA, negotiators were nominated by cited parties to an award. The Act did not specify nomination procedures, and r· equired the mediator convening the conciliation council to simply be satisfied that the nominated negotiators were representativ· e of the industry . . The practice was that the mediator asked the negotiators if they were representative of the industry, and then accepted their assurances that they were. Objections of various kinds were occasionally heard. But in the vast majority of award negotiations under the LRA, examination of the question of representation was cursory, if not farcical. An award agreed upon most obviously bound the cited employer parties and their employees. But the award was also binding on . all other employers, known as subsequent parties, and their employees -.._ throughout the industry. By virtue of the provisions of the LRA, and the award' 's coverage clause, the award bound all employers in the industry without their consent. The award also bound their employees without their consent. The award was negotiated by negotiators who simply did not ask for, and were not given the individual authority of employers and employees to act on their behalf.
Subsection 12 ( 1) of the E· CA makes it clear that the law has been r· eversed. The irony of the LRA was that negotiators were not required to have direct authority to represent individual employees or employers, yet it was a requkement that award negotiators have legal authority to reach binding agreements without first ~efening the ~eement back to those who were to be bound by it for their approval. Section 16 of the ECA pertains to the ratification of settlements where a contract is negotiated by an authorised reprẽsentative. A ratification procedure must be agreed prior to negotiations, and a settlement must be ratified if the agreement is to become a binding employment contract.
Discriminating against unionists
The union does not act on its own behalf as a collective or body corporate, but as a representative of its members. The union is treated w1der the Act as no more or less than a lawyer or industrial advocate. The point is of importance not only because of the administrative difficulties involved in obtaining individual authorities for large numbers of union members, but also to illustrate that the ECA treats the question of union membership as an issue different from that of the union's role as a representative. The right to union membership does not mean the same thing as the right to have your union representative recognised in the sense of being dealt with fairly or in good faith. An ẽmployer can actively discourage employees use of a representative, and actively encourage the employees to abandon their representative. The employer can take up any or all of these tactics without being said to unduly influence the employees in respect to union membership.
• Sections 6 and 7 of the ECA establish that men•bs•dp fit An ernployer may simply refuse in negotiatious to employer has to recognise a union representative's contract, but the employer doesn't have to negotiate such a contract. Section 8 of the ECA d<'es not prohibit the employer directly approaching the employees about the advantages to them of negotiating directly with the employer and of revoking the authority previously given to their representative (or, indeed, the advantages of withholding authority and dealing directly with the employer in the frrst place). In short, nothing in the Act requires the employer to remain neutral in respect to influencing ẽmployees attitudes towards utilising or not utilising a bargaining representative. The employer, therefore, may at any time seek to convince the employee to revoke a bargaining authority, to abandon his or her bargaining agent, and to bargain directly with the employer over a collective contract. Hence, union recognition can be thwarted by the employer's refusal to negotiate a collective contract, or by the employer's persuasion of employees to revoke the union's bargaining authority.
The wording of the ECA simply does not say that the employer must recognise the representative in the sense of honourable dealings or negotiations in good faith. To the contrary, in Adams v AUiance Textiles, while initially accepting that the union would be party to a collective agreement, the company ultimately encouraged the employees to seek alternative advice. The company convinced employees either that the union was not acting in their best interests, or that they had no altẽmative but to sign contracts to which the union was not a party and of which union officials did not approvẽ. The company was negotiating at two plants, one at Redruth and the other at Mosgiel. The Court found that the company secured agreement with a single delegate at Redruth and ~eed to keep that agreement secret. The delegate did not have authority to negotiate on behalf of other employees, and the union was not party to the contract which the individual delegate signed. The company then announced to the Mosgiel workforce that agreement had been reached at Redruth on a contract that excluded the union. Employees then began signing up at both plants and the union was defeated. On the significance of the requirement to recognise a bargaining agent, Chief Judge Goddard of the Employment Court had this to say in Adams v Alliance Textiles:
It is dear that the respondents did ~ecognise the authority of the union to represent the applicants. So much so that they require the applicants to withdraw their appointment of the union as their representative as a condition of signing the contract personally. The contract referfed to is the contract which excluded the union as a party.
However, the judgement of the Employment Court in Adams vs Alliance Textiles was appealed. The Court of Appeal heard the case, but declined to decide the issues raised on the grounds that the issues were no longer alive. Nonetheless, in reaching this conclusion, the Court made a number of instructive comments which are of persuasive rather than precedential force. The Court expressed reservations about one aspect of the Employment Court decision. That aspect related to union recognition. The President of the Court of Appeal said:
As I understand the relevant passage in the judgement of Chief Judge Goddard reported in [1992] I E .. R.N.Z. at 1023-4, the proposition is that even while· a union's representative authority is in force the employer may approach the emplo) ees directly, provided only that undue influence is not used. I do not think it could be safely assumed that this is conect. But as ~~ question does not require determination in this case it is better not to express a final opanton and to sound a note of warning only. A word of warning should be noted. In the event that the Court a•rllldee special relationship exists, a critical issue ~ tile independent advice in to entel ing into the more obvious importance in respect to the relationship client. If the solicitor and the client enter into a widwat till.._.
from a second and independent solicitor, then a presu•nption is that could have taken advantage of the client because of the client's lack of both and independent advice about the law.
In the relationship between employer and employee, there is otlea a .aemployer's greater knowledge of labour law. There may be · w.l8e it that the employer is in a special relationship to the The supe1 ior position in regards to knowledge to dae effects of the contract, and that knowledge imparts the JX"'W whiah t p1 may be subject to the mgnment that the employer bas ex.a..t a I• employee where the employee has relied on the e•nployer's advice Ia contract which significantly disadvantages the employee. In 6A.,. employer sponsored and financially supported an alte1native known as the Mosgiel Independent Thought Society (MITS) . An employees organisation is not a source of advice which could be coasiclered where the issue of undue influence is raised.
Economic duress
The next question addressed in Adams v Alliance Teztilu been secured through harsh and oppressive behaviour or clUNIL behaviour the Chief Judge said:
The behaviour complained of must strike the CoiDt • blameworthy and as meting out intolerable It wiD ......U, deliberation and unwarranted severity. Deceptive or mis._., alleged and agga essive marketing by sbUng p01 SODalities do not the behaviour described in the subsection. The Chief Judge then went on to consider the question of duress. The Court decided that Alliance Textiles had threatened a legal lockout, and at one stage had legally locked out its employees. Without question, duress arises where one party to a contract illegal_ly acts to coerce the second party to enter into the contract. However, the ECA estabhshes that strikes and lockouts intended to secure a new collective contract are legal. Section 68 of the Act provides as follows:
Where any proceedings under this Act relat· e to the participation of the defendant in a strike or lockout (being proceedings alleging a breach of contract on the part of the defendant or seeking the imposition of a penalty under this Act), the Tribunal or the Court shall dismiss that action or those proceedings if it is satisfied that the participation in the strike or lockout was lawful under section 64 of this Act.
The tenn "any" emphasises that any, if not all, proceedings · will be dismissed if they relate to a lawful strike or lockout. Clearly an unlawful strike or lockout may qualify as economic duress, but the law establishes that economic pressure by way of strike or lockout is legitimate, even where the strike or lock~ut has dire social and economic consequences for those struck or locked out, and where the strike or lockout removes all practical options except consent to the tetnts insisted on by the initiator of the strike or lockout.
Effectiveness of lockouts under tbe ECA
In a pamphlet widely distributed to N· ew Zealand households, the government essentially guaranteed that, under the ECA, wages could not be reduced by unilateral decision or action of an employer. The basis of this undertaking was the belief that workers were protected by provisions of the ECA which provided that, upon the · expiry of a collective contract, employees are deemed to be on individual contracts based upon the expired collective contract. Further, the A· ct legalises strikes and loc~outs in r· espect only to collective, and not individual contracts. The government's undertaking seemed initially to be supported in a number of early court cases under the ECA. Eventually, however, a loophole emerged.
If an employer seeks to negotiate a collective c-ontract, then the · employer may lock out employees in an effort to procur· e that collective contract. A collective contract is a contract applying to two or more employees. As an example, an employer might seek to renew a collective · contract which has expired. The employees . are on individual contracts under the tenns of the expired collective contract. The employer has the right to lock out the workers. A second circumstance might involve a small employer with two employees who have never been covered by a collective · Contract. The employer may seek negotiations with these employees for a collective contract, and if necessary lock them out. Under either scenario, the employer may approach the employees and commence negotiations for a new collective contract. In either case the employer may legally lock out the employees. While the tettns and conditions of their individual contracts may be retained by employees who successfully resist a lockout, the resources of the individual employee are seldom such that resistance can be sustained indefinitely. · ([1993) 1 ERNZ 526), the employer made 159 employees redundant. The employees were · employed in the employer's catering section which was experiencing increased · competition at the Auckland air tettninal. The employees were replaced by independent contractors. Unkovich had initially argued that these were not independent contractors, but in effect ẽmployees of Air New Zealand. The argument did not succeed. The dismissal of the employees was held to be substantively justified, although Air New Zealand failed to handle the dismissals in a procedurally fair . manner.
The case illustrates that employees may be undercut by independent contractors who provide inferior wages and · conditions for their own employees. The use of redundancy thus becomes another weapon in the bargaining armoury of the ẽmployer. Either wages and conditions will be r· educed, or workers will be made redundant and replaced by contractors. The wẽapon is enhanced under the ECA because the competing independent contractors can utilise cheaper non-union labour.
Marketing the trade union
What Adams v Alliance Textiles confinns is that the ECA allows for a battle over the hearts and minds of employees. The ECA does not requirẽ employer neutrality in respect to the employees' decision as to whether a union is to be authorised as their reprẽsentative. A widi.!ange of tactics may be used by the employer to influence the decision, including the sponsorship of alternative employee organisations. The employer is prohibited from exercising undue influence against an employee's decision to join and remain in a trade union. On the other hand there appears to be little prohibition against the employer taking actions which render the union ineffective in its representation of the employee in bargaining over a collective contract. The employee is protected if he or she decides to join the union, but the union may be rendered so ineffective that there is no reason to join .
. The personal grievance procedures are one aspect of the ECA clẽarly designed on the basis of equity rather than the effi. cient operation of the labour market. The procedures themselves are in large measure the same as those under the LRA. The · critical changes have been the extension of coverage to all ẽmployees throughout the country, and the provision of adjudication, generally after · mediation, as the last avenue for disposing of a Adjudication is a relatively fonnal legal process. As a consequence, a significant majority of parties who appear before the Employment Tribunal are now represented by lawyers or industrial consultants. Under the ECA, the unions have lost significant ground in terrns of representing employees in personal grievance proceedings.
Under the LRA union membership was a required condition for access to the personal grievance procedures. It was a significant reason for joining a union. Under the ECA, not only has the statutory support for the union as a representative in collective bargaining· been abolished, but the one unique service unions provided their membership -personal grievance representation -has been let out to tender. Marketing the trade union in the market economy is not a task assisted by the ECA. The Impact of the ECA 1 01 market place. However, the Government will have been elected under the MMP electoral system, and the problem will not be fixed as in the past by the overnight dash of the legislative draftsmen's pen. The industrially vulnerable -wealthy employers, and employees not strategically placed within the economy -will be odd fellows waiting together for a legislative train which may be some time in arriving.
